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CIVIL PROCEDURE-ADMISSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS-42
PA CONS STAT ANN § 6141-"MARY CARTER" AGREEMENTS-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held where an agreement clearly
allies two or more parties against another, such that a clear poten-
tial exists which would not otherwise be apparent to the factfinder,
that part of the agreement, or at least the existence of the reason
for the potential bias, must be conveyed to the factfinder.
Hatfield v Continental Imports, Inc., 530 Pa 551, 610 A2d 446
(1992).
In April, 1978, Agnes Hatfield sustained permanent injuries to
her back when the chair upon which she was sitting suddenly col-
lapsed.1 In February, 1980, Agnes and her husband, Herbert,
("Hatfields") brought an action in the Philadelphia Court of Com-
mon Pleas against the sellers of the chair, Continental Imports,
Inc. ("Continental"), Marvin Gross and Leonard Gross, individu-
ally and trading as Warehouse Imports ("Gross").2 The complaint
set forth causes of action in negligence and products liability under
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 Thereafter,
Continental and Gross (the "original defendants") joined as an ad-
ditional defendant Talin Industria Arredamenti, S.P.A. ("Talin"),
an Italian manufacturer alleged to have built the chair.4
On June 20, 1983, the Hatfields and Hartford Mutual Insurance
Company ("Insurer"), liability insurer for the original defendants,
executed an eleven page document entitled "Settlement Agree-
ment and Release" ("Agreement").5 The Agreement was made part
1. Hatfield v Continental Imports, Inc., 5 Pa D & C 4th 99 (1989), rev'd, 396 Pa
Super 309, 578 A2d 530 (1990), rev'd, 530 Pa 551, 610 A2d 446 (1992).
2. Hatfield, 5 Pa D & C 4th at 100.
3. Id at 99. Section 402A reads:
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if a) the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such product, and b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2) the rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although the seller has exercised all possi-
ble care in the preparation and sale of his product, and b) the user or consumer has
not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
4. Hatfield, 5 Pa D & C 4th at 100.
5. Hatfield v Continental Imports, Inc., 530 Pa 551, 610 A2d 446, 448 (1992). The
Agreement while providing for a structured settlement releasing the original defendants,
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of the record by virtue of the original defendants' Amended An-
swer With New Matter which was filed after execution of the
Agreement."
Prior to the beginning of trial, Talin filed a motion seeking per-
mission from the court to introduce the Agreement into evidence.
After reviewing the Agreement, the trial court ruled that the
Agreement was admissible, accepting Talin's argument that the
Agreement constituted a "Mary Carter Agreement," 8 not a settle-
ment agreement, and thus 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann section 6141(c) did
not govern.9 The trial court, adopting the position taken by the
Florida Supreme Court in the case of Ward v Ochoa,1° stated that
also required the Hatfields to pursue an action against Talin. Hatfield, 5 Pa D & C 4th at
101. Specifically, the Agreement contained the following paragraph, which became the focal
point of the case:
In addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiffs also agree to pursue an action against
Talin Industries Arredament (sic). If the action against Talin Industries Arredament
(sic) is successful the Plaintiffs will return $50,000 to Releasees [Insurer and the origi-
nal defendants] free and clear of all fees and expenses except that releasors agree to
pay 50% of the expenses of the litigation against Talin Industries Arredament (sic)
incurred after the signing of the release. If Releasees are able to settle their claim
against Talin Industries Arredament (sic) prior to trial they will return to the
Releasees $25,000 free and clear of all fees and expenses.
Id.
6. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 449.
7. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 448.
8. The term "Mary Carter Agreement" derives its name from the Florida decision
Booth v Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 S2d 8 (Fla App 1967). The term is generally used to
apply to any agreement between the plaintiff and some (but less than all) defendants
whereby the parties place limitations on the financial responsibility of the agreeing defend-
ants. Maule Industries, Inc. v Rountree, 264 S2d 445, 447 (Fla App 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 284 S2d 389 (Fla 1973). Mary Carter Agreements usually have the following
features:
(1) the agreeing defendant(s) guarantees the plaintiff a minimum payment, often the
limit of defendant's liability insurance;
(2) the plaintiff agrees not to enforce against the agreeing defendant(s) any subse-
quent judgments;
(3) the agreement defendant(s) remains a part of the action and payments to plaintiff
are reduced if money is recovered, by settlement or judgment, from the non-agreeing
defendant(s); and
(4) the agreement is "secret" in that there is an understanding that it will not be
disclosed unless required by rules of court or a court of competent jurisdiction.
Hatfield, 610 A2d at 449.
9. Hatfield, 5 Pa D & C 4th at 104.
10. 284 S2d 385 (Fla 1973). In Ward the court held that the "Mary Carter Agree-
ment" was admissible in evidence at trial if the agreement shows that the signing defendant
will have his maximum liability reduced by increasing the liability of one or more co-defend-
ants. Ward, 284 Sd at 387. The court stated that "secrecy is the essence of such an agree-
ment because the court or jury as trier of fact, if apprised of this, would likely weigh differ-




"these agreements tend to encourage collusion which could result
in a denial of a fair trial to non-agreeing defendants."11 The
Hatfields and the original defendants then sought, and the trial
court granted, permission to take an interlocutory appeal.12
The superior court, while reversing the trial court's holding, de-
clined to evaluate whether this Agreement was a Mary Carter
Agreement.13 Instead, the superior court stated that even if the
pertinent Agreement was a "Mary Carter Agreement," the case
was nevertheless controlled by 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann section
6141(c) and, accordingly, the Agreement should not be disclosed to
a jury. 4 The superior court concluded by stating that the trial
court's ruling was contrary to the express mandate of section
6141(c) which prohibits admission of settlement agreements. 5
Reversing the superior court decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court began its analysis by stating that while categorizing an
agreement as a "Mary Carter Agreement" may be a convenient re-
search tool, such categorization does not dispositively answer the
admissibility or non-admissibility of a particular agreement."6
Rather, the court noted that unless relevant evidence was shown to
come within a rule which made it inadmissible, relevant evidence
was admissible. 17 In determining the relevancy of evidence, the
court, relying on precedent, held that "evidence is relevant if it
tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable."'"
Justice McDermott, writing for the majority, noted that the po-
tential bias of the original defendants was the "fact at issue" in the
appeal.' 9 Remarking that the supreme court had previously per-
mitted inquiry into the correlation between a witness' credibility
and that witness' potential responsibility for reimbursement, which
was dependent upon the outcome of the trial,20 the court agreed
11. Hatfield, 5 Pa D & C 4th at 102.
12. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 448. Interlocutory appeal is defined as "an appeal of a mat-
ter which is not determinable of the controversy, but which is necessary for a suitable adju-
dication of the merits." Black's Law Dictionary 563 (West, abridged 6th ed 1991).
13. Hatfield, 578 A2d at 531. Stating that this jurisdiction has not defined what a
"Mary Carter Agreement" is, the superior court explained that it would not undertake such
consideration or determine the effect such an agreement would have on this action. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 449.
17. Id. See also Clark v Essex Wire Corp., 361 Pa 60, 63 A2d 35 (1949).
18. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 449 citing Martin v Soblotney, 502 Pa 418, 422, 466 A2d
1022, 1024 (1983).
19. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 449.
20. Id at 450. See Profit-Sharing Blue Stamp Co. v Urban Redevelopment Auth. of
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with Talin that the Agreement between the Hatfields and the orig-
inal defendants was relevant to show the original defendants'
bias.2
In determining whether the Agreement, though relevant, fell
"within a rule which makes it inadmissible,"22 the majority opinion
embarked upon a four-part analysis of the Statutory Construction
Act of 1972.23 This analysis directed the court to ascertain the pri-
mary purpose of section 6141, the statutory proscription against
the admissibility of settlement agreements.24
Pittsburgh, 429 Pa 396, 241 A2d 116 (1968). Profit-Sharing involved an eminent domain
proceeding in which there was a claim by a lessee for future value of a leasehold in a build-
ing which had been condemned by the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh.
Profit-Sharing Blue Stamp Co., 241 A2d at 116. The owner of the building had been com-
pensated for the taking but the plaintiff also claimed compensation for the value of the
future interest of its leasehold. Id. The supreme court permitted the cross-examination of an
officer of the owner of the building with regard to a bond given by the owner to indemnify
the Authority in case the Authority was required to make payment to the tenant. Id at 118.
21. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 450.
22. Clark, 63 A2d at 38.
23. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 450. The Statutory Construction Act, 1972 Pa Laws 1339,
Section 3 codified at 1 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 1901 et seq (Purdon 1992) provides in relevant
part:
§ 1903. WORDS AND PHRASES.
Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according
to their common approved usage;
1 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1903 (Purdon 1992).
§ 1921. LEGISLATIVE INTENT CONTROLS.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General As-
sembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(4) The object to be attained.
1 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1921 (Purdon 1992).
§ 1922. PRESUMPTIONS IN ASCERTAINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute
the following presumptions, among others, may be used.
(1) That the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible
of execution or unreasonable.
(5) That the General Assembly intends to favor the public interest as against any
private interest.
1 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1922 (Purdon 1992).
§ 1924. CONSTRUCTION OF TITLES, PREAMBLES, PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS AND HEADINGS.
The title and preamble of a statute may be considered in the construction thereof.
...The headings prefixed to titles, parts, articles, chapters, sections and other divi-
sions of a statute shall not be considered to control but may be used to aid in the
construction thereof.
1 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1924 (Purdon 1992).
24. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 450, 451. Section 6141 of Title 42 provides in relevant part:
§ 6141. EFFECT OF CERTAIN SETTLEMENTS.
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Explaining that the determination was one of first impression for
the court, the court relied on a decision from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania" wherein
that court stated that the policy underlying this statute was a
means to encourage settlements.26 Furthermore, the court's own
examination found that the ancestry of the statutory section lies in
the honored common rule that, on public policy grounds, offers of
settlement and compromise are not generally admissible.2
Next, the court looked to the words of the statute, noting that
section 6141 was entitled "Effect of CERTAIN Settlements".28 The
court questioned whether the Agreement at issue was in fact a
"settlement" within the terms of the statute.29 Relying on the defi-
nition of "settlement" given by Black's Law Dictionary, 0 the court
concluded that the Agreement, when viewed in its entirety, could
not be described as a conclusive resolution or final disposition of
the matters between the plaintiffs and the original defendants.3'
Rather, the court observed that the Agreement was "merely the
first act in a two-act play, and matters between them will not be
conclusively resolved or finally disposed until the final curtain has
come down."32
Third, while recognizing that the drafters of the Agreement had
titled the document "Settlement Agreement and Release", the
court opined that "calling a thing something does not make it
so. ''3 Furthermore, the court commented that considering the par-
(A)PERSONAL INJURIES....
(B) DAMAGES TO PROPERTY ...
(c) ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE. Except in an action in which final settlement and re-
lease has been pleaded as a complete defense, any settlement or payment referred to
in subsections (a) and (b) shall not be admissible in evidence on the trial of any
matter.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6141 (Purdon 1982).
25. Young v Verson Allsteel Press Co., 539 F Supp 193 (ED Pa 1982).
26. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 451.
27. Id. See also Rochester v Machinery Corp, 498 Pa 545, 449 A2d 1366 (1982) and
Schlosser v Weiler, 377 Pa 582, 105 A2d 331 (1954) (settlements in matters of dispute are
favored by the law). Hatfield, 610 A2d at 451.
28. Id at 451 n 12 (emphasis added by the court).
29. Id at 451.
30. Black's Law Dictionary defines settlement as "an agreement by which parties
having disputed matters between them reach or ascertain what is coming from one to the
other . . ., to fix or resolve conclusively; to make or arrange for final disposition." Black's
Law Dictionary 955 (West, abridged 6th ed 1991).
31. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 451.
32. Id.
33. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 451. See Fidelity Title & Trust Co v Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 305 Pa 296, 157 A 614 (1931).
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agraph at issue in this appeal,3' the Agreement would more accu-
rately be described as a "Settlement and Reimbursement
Agreement."3"
Finally, the court addressed whether agreements such as these
should be admitted into evidence in toto.36 Providing guidance for
future courts faced with this same issue, Justice McDermott stated
that the court should review the agreement, balance its relevancy
against the potential for prejudice, and, exercising judicial discre-
tion, admit or exclude as much as it deems appropriate.3 7 However,
the court advised that if an agreement clearly joined two or more
parties against another, so that clear potential for bias existed
which would not otherwise be apparent to a fact finder, the fact
finder must be at least informed of the existence of a reason for
potential bias. 8 Hence, the court concluded that given the facts of
this case the jury was entitled to be informed of the financial inter-
ests which the original defendants retained in the Hatfields' suc-
cess against Talin.3 9
Justice Cappy, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the jury
should be apprised of the existence of the Agreement; however, he
disagreed with the majority on two points. 40 First, he disagreed
with the majority's characterization that the Agreement was some-
thing other than a "Settlement Agreement" in order to admit it
into evidence. 41 While agreeing that the public policy behind sec-
tion 6141(c) was to encourage settlements, the concurring opinion
stressed that another public policy was equally at stake in this
case: the right of a party against whom a witness is called to show
that such witness has an interest in or is biased as to the outcome
of the trial.'2
Justice Cappy stated that when two public policies conflict it is
the responsibility of the judiciary to balance both and make a de-
termination as to which policy is paramount.' 3 Accordingly, the
34. See note 5 for the text of the paragraph in issue.
35. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 452.
36. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "in toto" as "wholly; completely." Black's Law
Dictionary 569 (West, abridged 6th ed 1991).
37. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 452.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id (Cappy concurring). Justices Larsen and Papadakos joined in the concurring
opinion.
41. Id. See note 30 for the definition of "settlement."
42. Id at 453.
43. Id.
Vol. 31:901
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concurrence balanced the policy of impeaching a witness against
the administrative policy of encouraging settlements and con-
cluded that the "danger inherent" in refusing to allow the admissi-
bility of the Agreement during cross-examination outweighed the
public policy of encouraging settlements.""
Secondly, the concurring opinion, while agreeing that the jury
should have been instructed as to the financial interests which the
original defendants retained in the Hatfields' success, nevertheless
strongly asserted that the full dollar amount of the settlement
should not have been introduced into evidence, as the settlement
amount was not relevant to the issue of the credibility of the origi-
nal defendants. 5 The concurrence concluded that introducing the
total dollar settlement would unduly influence the jury and inter-
fere with its ability to independently determine the amount of
damages in the event the jury found Talin liable to the Hatfields.46
Pennsylvania has a strong and historical public policy establish-
ing that a party against whom a witness is called always has the
right to test the credibility of such witness during cross-examina-
tion.47 A witness' credibility may be tested by (1) showing his or
her bias or hostility, (2) proving facts which would make such feel-
ings probable, or (3) showing the witness has an interest in the
result of the trial. 8
However, of equal strength and historical foundation is another
Pennsylvania public policy which encourages settlements.49 The
General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania clearly
had this policy in mind when it enacted section 6141(c) of Title 42,
which precludes settlement agreements from being admitted in ev-
idence except in actions in which the settlement has been offered
as a complete defense.50
This note will examine the approach the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has taken in balancing these two policies and determining
44. Id.
45. Id at 454. Justice Cappy stated that what the majority has left unsaid, but which
follows from his analysis "is that the full dollar amount of the settlement should not be
introduced in evidence." Id.
46. Id.
47. Commonwealth v Williams, 524 Pa 218, 570 A2d 75 (1990); Downey v Weston,
451 Pa 259, 301 A2d 635 (1973).
48. See Williams, 570 A2d at 75; Commonwealth v Collins, 519 Pa 58, 545 A2d 882
(1988); and Downey, 301 A2d at 635.
49. Muhammad v Strassburger, 526 Pa 541, 587 A2d 1346, 1349 (1991).
50. Act of July 9, 1976, 1976 Pa Laws 586 § 2, effective June 27, 1978 codified at 42
Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6141 (Purdon 1982).
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whether "Mary Carter""1 agreements are admissible into evidence
for the purpose of cross-examining the settling defendant as to any
interest, bias or motive such party may have in the case. In order
to understand the court's reasoning, it is necessary to review the
development of the law, first as it pertains to impeachment of wit-
nesses and, secondly, as it pertains to the admissibility of settle-
ment agreements.
In Profit-Sharing Blue Stamp Co. v Urban Redevelopment
Auth.,52 an eminent domain proceeding brought by a lessee for fu-
ture value of its leasehold, the owner of the building had given a
$5,000 bond to the Urban Redevelopment Authority ("URA") to
reimburse it in case the URA had to make payment to the plain-
tiff-tenant.5 s An officer of the corporation which owned the build-
-ing was cross-examined with regard to the bond given by the cor-
poration to the URA and the corporation's potential responsibility
for reimbursement, which responsibility was dependent upon the
outcome of the trial.5 4 The supreme court held that such inquiry
was proper as bearing on the witness' credibility, especially since
the corporation, in which the witness was an officer, was obligated
to indemnify the URA if it was required to make payment to the
tenant.
5
In 1973, the supreme court, in Downey v Weston, verified that
the purpose of all impeachment was to affect the credibility of a
witness.5 6 At issue in the Downey appeal was whether it was proper
cross-examination to inquire into the close social relationship be-
51. See note 14 for the characteristics of a Mary Carter Agreement.
52. 429 Pa 396, 241 A2d 116 (1968).
53. Profit-Sharing Blue Stamp Co., 241 A2d at 117. The owner had previously been
compensated for the taking of its fee. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id at 118.
56. Downey, 301 A2d at 639. In Downey, the plaintiff brought an action seeking to
recover damages for a rare neurological disorder he developed allegedly caused by the
trauma he received in an automobile accident with the defendant. Id at 637. On cross-exam-
ination of defendant's medical expert witness, the plaintiff's counsel established (1) that a
close social and professional relationship existed between the witness and the defendant's
attorney and (2) that the defendant's attorney had allowed the expert to examine Downey's
medical records without first obtaining permission from the plaintiff. Id at 638.
The plaintiff's counsel then attempted to show by way of further cross-examination of the
witness that such a disclosure of the plaintiff's medical records violated the Hippocratic
Oath and Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association. Id. However,
the trial court barred this line of cross-examination. Id at 639. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the interest in or bias of a witness towards either party in a
lawsuit may be exposed upon cross-examination, and in some instances blocking of such a
line of attack may constitute reversible error. Id.
Vol. 31:901908
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tween an expert witness and the co-defendant's attorney.5 7 The
court, citing Price v Yellow Cab Co. of Philadelphia,"8 held that "it
is beyond question that the interest or bias of a witness towards
either side of a lawsuit may be exposed upon cross-examination."5 9
*The scope of permissible testing of a witness' credibility under
Pennsylvania law has remained quite stable. The law has consist-
ently established that any witness bias, or at least the existence of
the reason for the potential bias, may be used to impeach a
witness. °
In 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v
Williams further reinforced this policy of testing a witness' credi-
bility by cross-examination.6 ' In Williams, the defendant appealed
his conviction alleging that the trial court erred when it permitted
the prosecution, on cross-examination of a defense witness, to im-
peach the witness by inquiring into unsentenced convictions of the
witness.6 2 The supreme court, in upholding the conviction, ex-
plained that while it is a general rule that unsentenced convictions
may not be used to impeach a witness, it is "equally true that a
party against whom a witness is called ALWAYS has the right to
show by cross-examination that a witness is biased or HAS AN IN-
TEREST IN THE RESULT, OF THE TRIAL."
6
The Pennsylvania policy which excludes settlement agreements
from evidence is based on the premise that such a policy encour-
ages settlements and reduces the stress and negativity associated
57. Id at 638.
58. 443 Pa 56, 278 A2d 161 (1971). In Price, an infant and her parents brought an
action against a taxicab company and an automobile driver for birth defects and related
expenses allegedly caused by injuries sustained by the infant's pregnant mother in an auto-
mobile-taxicab collision. Price, 278 A2d at 161. On direct examination, the mother's obste-
trician linked the collision with the plaintiff's birth defects. Id at 165. In an attempt to
demonstrate possible motive or bias of the obstetrician, the defendant's attorney sought to
introduce into evidence correspondence between the obstetrician and his professional insur-
ance carrier in which he notified the carrier of the possibility that a malpractice claim might
be filed against him. The court permitted the correspondence to be entered into evidence
explaining that a party is allowed to cross-examine a witness as to any interest, bias or
motive such witness may have. Id.
59. Downey, 301 A2d at 639.
60. See Collins, 545 A2d at 882; Commonwealth v Gwaltney, 497 Pa 505, 442 A2d 236
(1982); Commonwealth v Hamm, 474 Pa 487, 378 A2d 1219 (1977); and Commonwealth v
Cheatham, 429 Pa 198, 239 A2d 293 (1968).
61. Williams, 570 A2d at 75.
62. Id at 80. The defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder, criminal con-
spiracy and robbery. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added)
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with protracted litigation. 4 As early as 1954, the supreme court
stated that settlements in matters of dispute are favored by law.65
Contemporaneous with the enactment of the Pennsylvania Com-
parative Negligence Law,66 the General Assembly enacted 42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann section 6141, a seemingly inflexible proscription
against the introduction at trial of evidence of settlement agree-
ments.67 Furthermore, a review of the case law confirms that unless
a settlement has been offered as a complete defense, Pennsylvania
courts have consistently ruled that settlement agreements cannot
be introduced into evidence.6 8
In 1984, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Weingrad v Phil-
adelphia Electric Co. held that not only were settlement agree-
ments not admissible, but any mention of settlement agreements
between the parties was also inadmissible.69 Following the mandate
of section 6141(c), the superior court opined that the lower court
had committed error by informing the jury that the plaintiff had
settled with one of the defendants prior to trial.7 0 Nevertheless, the
superior court held that since the jury had not found the co-de-
fendant negligent, reversible error had not been committed.7 1 In-
terestingly, the court also indicated, in dictum, that the public pol-
64. Muhammad, 587 A2d at 1350.
65. Schlosser v Weiler, 377 Pa 582, 105 A2d 331 (1954). The plaintiff in Schlosser
brought suit to set aside a settlement agreement on grounds of fraud. The court, finding no
factual situation to support a finding of fraud, sustained the agreement holding that settle-
ments are favored in law. Schlosser, 105 A2d at 333.
66. Act of July 9, 1976, 1976 Pa Laws 586, codified in 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7102
(Purdon 1982). Under comparative negligence statutes, negligence is measured in terms of
percentage, and any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is sought.
Black's Law Dictionary 193 (West, abridged 6th ed 1991).
67. See note 24 for text of 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6141.
68. See Young v Verson Allsteel Press Co., 539 F Supp 193 (ED Pa 1982); Rochester
Machine Corp. v Mulach Steel, 498 Pa 545, 449 A2d 1366 (1982); and Schlosser v Weiler,
377 Pa 582, 105 A2d 331 (1954).
69. Weingrad v Philadelphia Electric Co., 324 Pa Super 16, 471 A2d 100 (1984). The
decedent, a flight instructor, was administering a bi-annual flight review of the owner/pilot
of an aircraft when the plane hit a utility pole owned by Philadelphia Electric Co., resulting
in the death of the flight instructor. Weingrad, 471 A2d at 101. The Administratrix of the
decedent's estate brought an action against the owner/pilot and the electric company. Id.
Before any testimony was given at trial, the court informed the jury that the plaintiff had
settled with the owner/pilot. Id. The jury subsequently found that both defendants were not
negligent, but that the deceased was negligent in that he failed to exercise reasonable care
for his own safety and that such negligence was a substantial factor in causing his own
death. Id at 103. The plaintiff appealed contending that the trial court erred in disclosing to
the jury that defendant Lippy had settled. Id at 102.
70. Id at 100.
71. Id at 103.
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icy of promoting settlements would not be frustrated by a law
which permitted the admission of evidence of settlements when of-
fered to prove bias or prejudice of a witness.72
Currently, there is a wide discrepancy in the way various juris-
dictions handle "Mary Carter Agreements." 3 In most jurisdictions,
such agreements are accepted; however, at least one jurisdiction
has completely voided the Agreements stating that they are con-
trary to public policy.
7 4
Notwithstanding this fact, most jurisdictions that accept Mary
Carter Agreements have allowed them into evidence when used to
impeach the testimony of the settling defendant.75 An influential
early Florida Supreme Court case involving the admissibility of a
Mary Carter Agreement, Ward v Ochoa,76 stated that "the search
72. Id at 102 n 3.
73. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Little, 276 Ark 511, 639 SW2d 726 (1982)
(The agreement must be disclosed to court and counsel and may be admitted into evi-
dence.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom; State v Ingram, 399 NE2d 808 (Ind App 1980)
(The jury should be made aware of the agreement to judge credibility of witnesses, but
should not see the agreement because of likely prejudice on issues of liability and amount of
damages.), aff'd, 427 NE2d 444 (Ind 1981); General Motors Corp. v Lahocki, 286 Md 715,
410 A2d 1039 (1980) (Mary Carter agreement must be disclosed to court and opposing coun-
sel, even without a discovery request to produce.); Hegarty v Campbell Soup Co., 214 Neb
716, 335 NW2d 758 (1983) (The entire agreement should be admitted into evidence.); Tay-
lor v DiRico, 124 Ariz 513, 606 P2d 3 (1980) (Where the court finds that the agreement does
not sufficiently prejudice the nonsettling defendant, it may not require disclosure).
74. Lum v Stinnett, 87 Nev 402, 499 P2d 347 (1971). The Nevada Supreme Court
ruled that Mary Carter Agreements, even where not secret, constitute maintenance and
champerty, contravene legal ethics, and prejudice nonsettling defendants. Lum, 499 P2d at
350-52.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled similarly in Trampe v Wisconsin Tel. Co., 214 Wis
210, 252 NW 675 (1934), although the decision could be read to prohibit only secret
agreements.
"Maintenance" is an expression for a third party's meddling in a lawsuit by encouraging,
assisting or maintaining a party, either with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend the
litigation. Black's Law Dictionary 658 (West, abridged 6th ed 1991). "Champerty" is main-
tenance with a financial motive, such as the financial support of a third party's lawsuit in
consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds. Black's Law Dictionary 157
(West, abridged 6th ed 1991).
75. See Sequoia Manufacturing Co. v Halec Construction Co., 117 Ariz 11, 570 P2d
782 (Ariz Ct App 1977); Pellet v Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal 2d 705, 160 P2d 783 (1945); Ward v
Ochoa, 284 S2d 385 (Fla 1973); Gatto v Walgreen, 61 Ill 2d 513, 337 NE2d 23 (1975); Bur-
kett v Crulo Trucking Co., 171 Ind App 166, 355 NE2d 253 (1976); General Motors Corp. v
Lahocki, 286 Md 714, 410 A2d 1039 (1980); Grillo v Burke's Paint Co., 275 Or 421, 551 P2d
449 (1976); and General Motors Corp. v Simmons, 558 SW2d 855 (Tex 1977).
76. 284 S2d 385 (Fla 1973). In Ward, the parents of a minor decedent brought a
wrongful death action against bus owner, bus driver and motorist. The Florida Supreme
Court held that the trial court had erred in denying the non-settling defendant's motion for
an order requiring plaintiffs to produce for inspection and copying a "Mary Carter Agree-
ment" and thus the non-settling defendants were entitled to a new trial. Ward, 284 S2d at
Duquesne Law Review
for the truth, in order to give justice to the litigants, is the primary
duty of the courts."' 7 Accordingly, the court held that Mary Carter
Agreements were admissible because the court or jury as trier of
fact would likely weigh differently the testimony and conduct of
the signing defendant as related to the non-signing defendant if
not apprised of the Agreement.
7
This type of judicial solution, however, faces a potential barrier
in jurisdictions like Pennsylvania, which have statutes proscribing
the admissibility of settlement agreements e.7  By determining that
the agreement in Hatfield was not a final settlement agreement as
the statute intended, the majority's decision cleverly avoided any
statutory barrier to the agreement's admissibility into evidence.
8 0
The concurring opinion in Hatfield also attempted to avoid the
statutory barrier to the admissibility of the agreement. However,
instead of engaging in a lengthy statutory interpretation analysis
to determine if the agreement was a final settlement, Justice
Cappy employed a balancing test between the two competing in-
terests at issue: the right to impeach a witness and the policy of
encouraging settlements by disallowing settlement agreements into
evidence.81 After weighing these interests, it was Justice Cappy's
opinion that the danger inherent in not allowing a party to im-
peach the credibility of a witness far outweighed the administra-
tive policy of encouraging settlements.8 "
Although the majority decision, focusing on a statutory interpre-
tation analysis, was sound, it does not resolve the admissibility is-
sue as expeditiously as does the concurring opinion. Nonetheless,
neither the majority nor concurring opinion clearly eliminates the
potential statutory barriers imposed by section 6141.83
The plain language of this statute seems to prohibit the admissi-
bility of any settlement agreement, even on cross-examination of a
witness for purpose of showing bias. It is likely, however, that this
388.
77. Id at 387.
78. Id.
79. See Minn Stat Ann § 604.01(4) (West 1988)("Except in an action in which settle-
ment and release has been pleaded as a defense, any settlement or payment referred to in
subdivision 2 and 3 shall be inadmissible in evidence on the trial of any legal action."); Wis
Stat Ann § 885.285(2) (West Supp 1992) ("Any settlement or payment under sub. (1) is not
admissible in any legal action unless pleaded as a defense.")
80. Hatfield, 610 A2d at 452.
81. Id at 453 (Cappy concurring).
82. Id.
83. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6141 (Purdon 1982).
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statute was never meant to apply to the impeachment of a witness
pertaining to the bias that results from the witness' entry into a
settlement agreement. 4
In sum, to avoid future confusion and disagreement over the ad-
missibility of certain settlement agreements, especially those agree-
ments similar to the Hatfield agreement, the General Assembly of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania should amend section 6141.
The statute, as amended, should specifically permit the admission
of evidence of settlement agreements when offered to prove bias or
prejudice of a witness. Such a revision would clearly be consistent
with Pennsylvania's strong public policy of a party's right to test
the credibility of a witness during cross-examination as well as the
strong public policy which encourages settlements by precluding
settlement agreements from being admissible into evidence.
Barbara S.C. Campbell
84. Compare Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which prohibits admission of com-
promises and offers to compromise to prove or disprove liability, but which adds, "This rule
also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as
proving bias or prejudice of a witness .. " FRE 408.
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